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Challenging Defamatory Opinions as an
Alternative to Media Self-Regulation
James F. Ponsoldt*
INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of channels dedicated to news, debate,
and commentary across all forms of media-including cable, radio,
and the Internet-there has been an explosion of largely unre-
strained trafficking in opinion. Many of these opinions imply un-
derlying facts about public figures. Like other businesses, the me-
dia needs a product to sell. Increasingly, the media's product is the
presentation of contentious opinion that has successfully attracted
niche audiences in an otherwise fragmented market.
The "coverage" of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, a recent exam-
ple in which there were few hard facts to report, created an un-
precedented atmosphere of speculative "information" published
about a number of people. President Bill Clinton and Monica
Lewinsky were not the only public and private parties caught up in
the controversy. Others included Vernon Jordan, Linda Tripp,
Bruce Lindsay, and Sidney Blumenthal.
Notwithstanding polls that demonstrate that the public is not
buying what the media is selling,' the content of commentary has
* Joseph Henry Lumpkin Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law,
J.D. Harvard, 1972.
1. For example, in a New York magazine poll released in November 1998, fifty per-
cent of those surveyed said that the media's Monica Lewinsky coverage has been
"somewhat" or "very" irresponsible. See Howard Kurtz, Not in it for the Sport; Keith
Olbermann, Putting MSNBC Behind Him, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1998, at BO. Forty-
seven percent said that President Clinton's continued popularity reflects the public
"sending a message to the media that they are tired of this story." Id. Forty-eight percent
said they aren't paying attention to the story anymore, forty-three percent said they do not
want to hear any more, and seven percent said that they could not get enough. See id.
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become even less restrained since Clinton's half-hearted national
"apology."2 In cable programming over the past year, for example,
there has been an apparent lack of'concern by commentators, par-
ticularly those with political goals, about the potential civil conse-
quences of reckless commentary. However, a strong consensus of
media critics opposes governmental regulation. The alternative
they propose to media "recklessness" is "self-regulation," the ap-
plication of professional editorial judgment to the content of what
is published.
The media assumes that "opinion," no matter how nasty and
outrageous, is not only a marketable commodity but also immune
from legal challenge. They base their assumption on a broad inter-
pretation of First Amendment freedoms.3 Coupled with a lack of
2. On August 17, 1998 President Clinton addressed that nation after testifying be-
fore the Office of Independent Counsel and a grand jury earlier that day:
I answered their questions truthfully, including questions about my private life.
Questions no American citizen would ever want to answer. Still, I must take
complete responsibility for all my actions, both public and private. And that is
why I'm speaking to you tonight. As you know, in a deposition in January, I
was asked questions about my relationship with Monica Lewinsky. While my
answers were legally accurate, I did not volunteer information. Indeed, I did
have a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that was not appropriate. In fact, it was
wrong. It constituted a critical lapse in judgment and a personal failure on my
part for which I am solely and completely responsible. But I told the grand jury
today, and I say to you now, that at no time did I ask anyone to lie, to hide or
destroy evidence or to take any ot -r unlawful action. I know that my public
comments and my silence about this matter gave a false impression. I misled
people, including even my wife. I deeply regret that.., our country has been
distracted by this matter for too long. And I take my responsibility for my part
in all of this. That is all I can do.
ABC News Special Report: The President Apologizes to the American Public Bill
Clinton Admits to Improper Behavior (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 17, 1998), avail-
able in 1998 WL 8056120.
3. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution proclaims that the "Con-
gress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. One commentator asserts that:
[S]tate recognition and enforcement of private rights touching forms of com-
munication is itself sufficient to subject the resulting exercises of private power
to constitutional scrutiny can hardly be doubted. Perhaps the most familiar ex-
ample is the line of United States Supreme Court decisions commencing with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. ... [In that case, d]espite the fact that the role
of the state was limited to the enforcement of private rights, the Court showed
no hesitation in subjecting the entire regime to constitutional inspection....
New York Times... concerned the limitations imposed by the first amendment
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effective media self-regulation, this interpretation causes the media
to act as if the targets of published viciousness have no remedy-
that public figures are sitting ducks for allegations cloaked as
"opinion" because opinion cannot be deemed false.
As evidenced by Blumenthal v. Drudge , there is an underutil-
ized alternative to media self-regulation: defamation law.' Sidney
Blumenthal's recent action for defamation against Matt Drudge for
publishing claims that Blumenthal, a Clinton White House aide,
had a history of wife-beating reflects the current state of the law of
defamation. The fact that summary judgment was upheld for
Drudge in the Blumenthal case reiterates the lack of media ac-
countability arising from alleged defamatory opinion or specula-
tion which implies an underlying, verifiable fact. However, similar
future actions by public figurers may yet serve the public interest
in restoring the proper balance between promoting robust public
debate and protecting individual reputations.
This Essay analyzes defamation law as it applies to the media.
Part I summarizes'the state of defamation law prior to the 1990
Supreme Court decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., when
opinion was presumed immune from liability. Part II examines the
holding in Milkovich, which suggests the potential liability for
recklessly defamatory statements couched as or in the context of
opinion. Part III reviews post-Milkovich decisions during the
1990's. This Essay concludes that the predictions of Milkovich
were accurate in many jurisdictions and could apply to televised
allegations during the coverage of the Clinton affair. The defama-
tion law alternative to media self-regulation awaits only additional
upon state doctrines restricting forms of expression that might intrude upon
personal rights. Similar constitutional limitations operate with respect to state-
ordained property rights.
Robert C. Denicola, Trademark as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging
Rationales for the Protection of the Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 207 (1982).
4. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
5. See generally Toney v. WCCO Television, 85 F.3d 383 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the Minnesota Supreme Court, as predicted by the Court of Appeals, would recog-
nize a cause of action for implied defamation where defendant omits important facts or
where the defendant juxtaposes a series of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection
between them). For a discussion of "implied" defamation, see Foretich v. American
Broad. Co., Nos. CIV.A. 93-2620, 94-0037,1997 WL 669644, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 17,
1997).
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plaintiffs, like Blumenthal or perhaps non-public figures, to help
the media serve the public interest by exercising media self-
restraint and curtailing the destruction of individual reputations.
I. PRE-MILKOVICH DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACT AND OPINION
Prior to the Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.6 decision, most
courts assumed that a constitutional privilege or immunity existed
for opinion. As long as sixteen years after the fact, dictum in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.7 appeared to establish a privilege making
statements of opinion non-actionable.8 Gertz involved a policeman
convicted of murder and a subsequent civil suit against the con-
victed murderer. 9 Gertz was the plaintiffs attorney, who was ac-
cused by American Opinion'° of being part of a "frame-up" and
scheme to discredit the local police."
In Gertz, the fact/opinion distinction was never actually raised
because the Supreme Court assumed that the statements made by
American Opinion were demonstrably false and thus per se action-
able.'2 The statements were said to contain "serious inaccuracies"
in that Gertz was never a member of a Communist organization,
and no evidence linked him to the Chicago riots. 3
Justice Powell enunciated the so-called Gertz immunity doc-
trine: "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
6. 497 U.S. I (1990).
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. See id. at 339-40.
9. See id. at 325.
10. American Opinion is a publication associated with the John Birch Society. See
id.
11. See id. at 325-26. Specifically, the monthly magazine labeled Gertz a "Lenin-
ist" and "Communist-fronter." Id. at 326. In addition, the writer insinuated that Gertz
was involved in the attacks on Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention.
See id. at 326.
12. See id. at 332. Rather, Gertz primarily addressed whether private defamation
plaintiffs are required to prove that defendants acted with actual malice. See id. at 325.
13. Id. at 326. The managing editor did not verify the charges by the author, who
had studied the underlying murder case but never investigated Gertz himself. See id. at
327.
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the competition of other ideas."' 4 Thus, as suggested in Gertz, pre-
Milkovich courts believed that this statement promoted the voicing
of opinions as a means of spurring debate in society. The courts
also interpreted the statement as a test to distinguish fact, which is
actionable, from opinion, which is not actionable. 5 This distinc-
tion came to be known as the Olman test.16
The Olman v. Evans decision, rendered ten years after Gertz,
involved a university professor of political science who sued
newspaper columnists for defamation. 7 The alleged defamation
occurred in an article that claimed that the plaintiff professor was a
Marxist who used "higher education for indoctrination."" After
the article appeared in the newspaper, the political science profes-
sor was denied the position of chairman of a university depart-
ment. 9
Unlike the Gertz court, the Olman court directly addressed the
fact/opinion distinction; finding the distinction to be a matter of
law, the Olman court kept the decision from a jury.0 Ironically,
Judge Kenneth Starr wrote the opinion for the D.C. circuit and ap-
plied what became the famous four-factor Olman test." The first
factor examines the common usage or meaning of the specific lan-
guage. Under this prong, the more precise the definition or com-
monly associated meaning of the words, the more likely the state-
ment would be found a statement of fact and thus potentially
14. Id. at 339-40.
15. See id.
16. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
17. See id. at 971.
18. Id. The article was entitled "The Marxist Professor's Intentions" and stated
Oilman "is widely viewed in his profession as a political activist." Id. at 971-972.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 981. This finding is consistent with most post-Gertz authority. See id.
at 978.
21. See id. at 979-84. The court realized the difficulty in establishing a test "as evi-
denced by the capacity of the same words to convey different meanings in different con-
texts, it is quite impossible to lay down a bright-line or mechanical distinction." Id. at
978. See also Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (1986) (finding pure opinion
absolutely protected under First Amendment, but that no bright line rule exists to distin-
guish fact from opinion).
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actionable."2
Second, the court examined verifiability. The verifiability test
asks whether the statement can be proven true or false. If an ordi-
nary reader would recognize a statement to be verifiable, the reader
is less likely to view the statement as mere opinion. 3 Thus, if the
reader can check an alternative source to see if the statement is
true, then the statement is less likely to be attributed to the writer's
own thoughts or opinion.
The next factor of the Olman test reviews the allegedly de-
famatory language in the full context of the entire statement. The
language surrounding the allegedly defamatory statement should
be examined for cautionary language that signals an opinion. 4
Such cautionary language might consist of "[i]n the opinion of' or
"I think."" Finally, the judge should examine the broader context
in which the statement appears.26 The broader setting includes the
type of magazine printing the statements or the location of the arti-
cle within the newspaper. For example, the placement of the arti-
cle containing the allegedly defamatory statements on the editorial
page of the newspaper is likely to signal statements of opinion. 7
Placement on the editorial page alone, however, is not disposi-
tive; rather, the four factors were considerations to be balanced
with each other. Thus, the Olman test requires a fact-specific ex-
amination to distinguish actionable fact from immune opinion.
Under the test, for example, hyperbolic statements about an elected
official by a recognized political opponent on a cable channel talk
program would likely be considered immune opinion.
Statements of opinion were not the only statements protected
by pre-Milkovich courts. The courts also protected rhetorical hy-
perbole, which was usually defined as exaggeration, name calling,
or an expression of emotion." In addition, words used in a loose or
22. See Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979-81.
23. See id. at 981. The verifiability test may be stated as: "[I]s the statement objec-
tively capable of proof or disproof?" Id.
24. See id. at 982.
25. Id. at 983.
26. See id. at 984.
27. See Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974).
28. See id. at 284-86.
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figurative sense were not actionable. 9 That exception stems back
to the policy arguments of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,0 which
balanced the protection of the individual's reputation with soci-
ety's need for open debate and free speech. When the words can
probably be viewed as emotionally induced rather than fact-based,
the balance tips in favor of free speech,3 preempting state defama-
tion tort law. Therefore, neither the court nor a jury would need to
address the "recklessness" component of the "actual malice" stan-
dard applicable to public figure plaintiffs in defamation suits.
More so than even after 1990 pre-Milkovich, elected officials were
sitting ducks for vituperative political opponents. Prior to 1990,
their defamation claims would rarely reach a jury, and were not, in
effect, pursued.
II. MILKOvIcH v. LORAIN JOURNAL CO.
The view that "opinion" was made immune by the Gertz dic-
tum formally ended with the Milkovich decision. In Milkovich, the
Supreme Court explicitly held that no federal constitutional privi-
lege exists for opinion, and thus there was no preemption of state
defamation law.32 The case involved a high school wrestling coach
named Mike Milkovich who sued the local newspaper over an arti-
cle by a sports columnist that stated the coach lied at a hearing.33
The article further stated that everyone knew the coach had lied.34
29. See id. (finding that loose or figurative words were not actionable under federal
labor laws).
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. One exception to this general premise was outlined in Cianci v. New York Times
Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980). In Cianci, the court found charges of crimi-
nal activity to be treated as accusations of fact and thus actionable. The Cianci court
found immaterial that the accusation may be phrased as opinion. See id. at 64.
32. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 10 (1990). The Court stated
that "[tihe First Amendment does not require a separate 'opinion' privilege limiting the
application of state defamation laws. While the Amendment does limit such applica-
tion .... the breathing space that freedom of expression requires to survive is adequately
secured by existing constitutional doctrine." Id.
33. See id. at 6-7. The title of the sports column read "Maple beat the law with the
'big lie."' Id. The article then proclaimed that individuals in power were able to lie suc-
cessfully. See id. Finally, the column stated that among "[tihe teachers responsible [was]
mainly head Maple wrestling coach, Mike Milkovich . I..." d  at 4-5.
34. See id. at 5. The columnist stated that if an individual had been at the wrestling
match in question would know Milkovich lied on the stand, and thus was guilty of per-
1998]
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Milkovich charged that the article accused him of perjury and was
thus libelous per se. In light of their factual bases, comparisons are
unavoidable between the Milkovich article and Clinton-Lewinsky
commentary.
When the defendant newspaper columnist invoked the Gertz
dictum as providing him with a privilege, the Court responded that
Gertz never intended to "create a wholesale defamation exemption
for anything that might be labeled 'opinion."' 35 Rather, the court
stated that a distinction between fact and opinion was not essential;
"expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objec-
tive fact.
36
The rejection of the fact/opinion distinction and formal immu-
nity for opinion are the pivotal elements of Milkovich.37 In altering
the way many commentators, attorneys, and judges should view
defamation law, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that
every First Amendment defamation challenge requires a prelimi-
nary inquiry into whether the statement is fact or opinion. Prior to
1990, this distinction had been seen as the crucial characterization
and safeguard that precluded the possibility of a defamation cause
of action from surviving a motion for summary judgment. Thus, it
was believed liability for highly damaging reckless opinion could
not exist. The trial courts would prevent such a claim from reach-
ing a jury.
The Supreme Court proposed that the fact/opinion distinction
was immaterial because any statement not provable as false by the
jury.
35. Id. at 18. In advancing this idea, the Court specifically relied on Judge Friendly
and Justice Holmes. See id. Judge Friendly read Gertz dictum to associate the word
"opinion" with the word "idea"; thus, all ideas, not all statements, are protected. See
Cianci v. New York Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 62 n.10 (2d Cir. 1980). Judge
Friendly's interpretation goes back to Justice Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" concept;
truth is likely to be attained if competing ideas are allowed to be voiced. See Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
36. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.
37. According to one commentator, Milkovich "was an appropriate case for the
Court to use in striking down the opinion defense because the defamatory statement
complained of was difficult to classify as either fact or opinion." John B. David, Note,
Defamation Action for Opinion: An Analysis of the Effect of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co., 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 643, 657 (1991).
[Vol.9:45
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plaintiff would still be protected by the Constitution,3" regardless of
whether it was presented as fact or opinion. Thus, the focus shifted
to the verifiability of the allegedly defamatory statement as truth-
ful-often a jury issue-rather than on a judicial characterization
of the statement as fact or opinion. Applying this new focus to the
facts of Milkovich, the Court found no privilege and remanded the
case to the lower court.39
Specifically in Milkovich, the implication that Coach Milk-
ovich committed perjury was sufficiently verifiable to be consid-
ered factual.40  The Milkovich article could be compared to the
minutes of the local Board meeting and the Coach's trial testimony
for discrepancies, thus determining whether perjury had been
committed as alleged.4' To reiterate, perhaps the most significant
aspect of this change of focus is that a jury, not the court, would
conduct the comparison.
The new focus of the test is whether a reasonable fact finder
can find the challenged statement verifiably true or false. As noted
above, Gertz had suggested that the fact/opinion distinction was it-
self of constitutional importance and to be determined by the judge
as a matter of law. After Milkovich and its new test, a greater
number of decisions would require trials. And if the public senti-
ment is running against an unrestrained media, a jury chosen from
that public might prove to be a hostile audience.
As was typical of Supreme Court First Amendment decisions
of that era, Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the ma-
jority opinion. Marshall and Brennan essentially agreed with the
majority's theory but differed on the application of the theory to
38. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 (1990). To quell the fears that speech would now
be restricted; the Court added that enough safeguards were left intact to ensure public de-
bate without an "artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact." Id. at 19. In addition,
the Court felt the new test was still faithful to the "breathing space" requirement of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Id. at 19.
39. See id. at 23.
40. See id. at 21. In Scott v. News-Herald, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the
proximity in the column of the two statements "lied at the hearing" and "after... having
given his solemn oath to tell the truth" led to the inference that Milkovich committed
perjury. 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (Ohio 1986).
41. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. The Court concluded the alleged perjury at the
trial was a "verifiable event." Id.
.1998]
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the facts of the case. Justice Brennan wrote that lower courts had
been under a "misimpression that there is a so-called opinion
privilege wholly in addition to the protections we have already
found to be guaranteed by the First Amendment... .,,4 Applying
the majority's test, the dissenters did not believe that a reasonable
fact finder could deem the sports columnist's statements to imply
verifiable facts, which would make them non-actionable. 4  The
dissenters examined the entire context of the article to find whether
the statements were arguably verifiable as fact."
The Court's majority realized that future media defendants
would be concerned about the outcome. To quell their fears, the
Court left safeguards intact to ensure public debate was possible
without an "artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact '"45--
even after Milkovich. These safeguards were intended to ensure
that courts remaining faithful to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
could balance freedom of speech and protection of individual
46
reputations .
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is not the only case law the
Supreme Court specifically cited as remaining good law after
Milkovich. The Court also left other fact/opinion tests intact. Ap-
parently, after the sixteen-year presumption of a constitutional
privilege for opinion under the Gertz dictum, the Court did not
want to leave any room for doubt.
The Milkovich Court emphasized that statements which cannot
be proven false are still protected by the Constitution.41 Further-
more, "rhetorical hyperbole" and verbal abuse, such as name-
42. Id. at 24. The majority, likewise, rejected a blanket opinion theory. See id. at
21.
43. See id. at 24-25. In dissent, Justice Brennan believed the column's statements
deserved "full constitutional protection." Id. For a recent discussion of "implied defa-
mation," see Toney v. WCCO Television, 85 F.3d 383 (8th Cir. 1996).
44. See id. at 28. Justice Brennan believed that the writer's statements were "pat-
ently conjecture" and the writer clearly showed what statements were based on fact and
which statements were mere guesses. Id.
45. Id. at 19.
46. See id. at 20.
47. See id. at 16. See generally Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767 (1986) (finding that plaintiff must show falsity of statement before seeking dam-
ages).
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calling and "imaginative expression," remain protected and thus
non-actionable.4 ' The Milkovich Court did not literally bar any
opinion defense, but rather it refocused the inquiry into a plaintiff's
obligation to prove falsity without relying on the fact/opinion dis-
tinction. The level of fault the plaintiff must prove, actual malice
for a public figure plaintiff, and the limitations on damages did not
change, reaffirming the tests set forth in Gertz and New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan.
Despite Milkovich, the so-called "opinion privilege" is not
completely dead, but rather it remains in practice in the lower
courts. As noted, during pre-trial discovery and, if necessary, at
trial, the defense now depends on the plaintiff's evidence that the
statement is false. Thus, "opinion" not suggesting a false fact is
not defamatory. And conversely, "opinion" which can be reasona-
bly interpreted as stating or implying assertions of fact which are
provable as false is not protected, even if the speaker intended the
statement as opinion. Under this new test, a false "idea" or opinion
may exist if the speaker makes the statement as an "opinion," but it
contains or implies assertions of fact which are provably false.
Namely, it exists if the speaker means the statement as opinion but
the reasonable listener interprets the statement as fact. In the con-
text of political hyperbole when false facts are implied, proving the
additional element of "recklessness" by a public official may now
be less difficult than it has been in the past. 9
To illustrate this new test, the Supreme Court presented the
following example. A speaker may make two statements, both of
48. Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (finding that the
accusation of developer's negotiation stance as "blackmail" not actionable).
49. The task of a public figure to prove "recklessness," of course, should not be un-
derestimated, as indicated to former Reagan official Robert McFarlane. See generally,
McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that
the evidence presented was not enough to prove, clearly and convincingly, that the author
and publisher defendants published the book in question with actual malice). According
to the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, "the standard of ac-
tual malice is a daunting one." Id. at 1515 (quoting McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74
F.3d 1296, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Sidney Blumenthal's case against Matt Drudge may
not be indication enough whether the standard is insurmountable, at least in the District
of Columbia. Future plaintiffs might well investigate the impact of alleged defamatory
media publications outside New York, New Jersey, and Washington, D.C. in determining
where to litigate defamation claims.
1998]
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which can equally hurt an individual's reputation: (1) "Jones is a
liar." and (2) "In my opinion, Jones, is a liar."5 Under the old test,
arguably the second statement would be protected because it was
couched as a statement of opinion. Under the new test, however,
both statements may be actionable, as amplified by Justice White's
decision in Toney v. WCCO Television,5 because each statement
implies the speaker knows the facts to support it.52 Thus, the rea-
sonable fact finder may determine that a statement could be verifi-
able as true or false, and is actionable if the statement is false.
The verifiability test is critical in Milkovich. The test had been
earlier described as a factor in the Olman test, along with the three
other factors discussed above, to distinguish fact from opinion.
After Milkovich, the verifiability prong is the only Olman factor
that explicitly survives. The contextual factors and common usage
factor of Ollman were not employed in Milkovich and should be-
come less relevant over time. Specifically, as illustrated in the
Jones example, the Court stated that using the words "[i]n my
opinion" does not turn a statement into an opinion. 3 Moreover,
engaging in defamatory rhetoric on a television talk show will not
per se protect the speaker, even if such a program is known as an
environment for exaggeration.
As one example, during commentary following President
Clinton's brief televised address to the public about his relation-
ship with Monica Lewinsky, Dan Quayle stated on ABC's Night-
line that Clinton "basically admit[ted] ... perjury. 54 On the same
evening, Congressman Bob Barr appeared on Larry King Live, a
CNN cable show, and stated that Clinton "has told the world 'I am
a liar, I am a perjurer."' 5 In addition, former prosecutor Barbara
50. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19.
51. 85 F.3d 383 (8th Cir. 1996).
52. See id. at 386-87.
53. Milkovich, 476 U.S. at 18-19. See also Cianci v. New York Times Publ'g Co.,
639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980) (arguing that words "I think" cannot render defamatory state-
ment non-actionable).
54. Nightline: What Did He Say? President Clinton Admits Having Sexual Rela-
tions (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 17, 1998), available in 1998 WL 5373113. See
also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
55. Larry King Live: Clinton Speaks Before the Nation (CNN cable broadcast, Aug.
17, 1998) (transcript on file with the FORDHAM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MEDIA &
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Olson stated that Clinton "committed perjury."56 Hypothetically, if
Clinton could show that he did not, as a matter of law, commit
and/or admit to the felony of perjury, Quayle, Barr, and Olson
could be found liable for defamation after Milkovich. The same
may hold for other obvious political opponents. Recognition of
such potential liability could serve to return public debate about
public figures to a more responsible level.
III. POST-MILKOVICH DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACT AND OPINION
As with most landmark cases, the application of Milkovich and
its new test has not been uniform by the lower courts. However,
some basic judicial responses have emerged with respect to
whether a particular comment is actionable. 7 Generally, the lower
courts hold that if a statement is provably false under Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,5 then it is actionable. If a statement is
considered rhetorical hyperbole, then it is not actionable. Thus, the
courts generally follow tests that remain true to Milkovich. How-
ever, as illustrated by the recent decision Biospherics v. Forbes,
Inc.," the Fourth Circuit is one example of a court which has re-
tained the contextual Olman factors to determine whether a state-
ment is provably false.6 ° The Milkovich court did not explicitly
reject or embrace the contextual factors, but rather it cautioned
against using contextual factors in determining whether a statement
should be deemed actionable.
Certain pre-Milkovich tenets still remain strong. For example,
ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL).
56. Id.
57. In a lesser known, but important recent defamation decision, the Ninth Circuit
upheld jurisdiction where the media defendant's only forum-related activity was circu-
lating a newspaper in which the allegedly defamatory opinion appeared to only eighteen
California subscribers. See Gordy v. The Daily News, 95 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1996).
58. 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding that the truth is not a defense and that the plaintiff
has burden of proving statement is false).
59. 151 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that magazine article not actionable).
Biospherics, the most recent interpretation of Milkovich, recognized that "an opinion may
constitute actionable defamation" if the opinion reasonably implies untrue facts. Id.
60. The danger is that jurisdictional discrepancies across factors may encourage fo-
rum-shopping by potential plaintiffs. See Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publica-
tions, 953 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding Ollman test may still be valid because
law not substantially changed).
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in Unelko Corp. v. Rooney,6 the plaintiff brought suit after defen-
dant Andy Rooney, on a televised segment, claimed one of plain-
tiffs products did not work.62 Following Milkovich, the appeals
court held that the defendant's statement about the product was not
protected opinion.6 3 However, the plaintiff still bore the burden of
proving the statement was false. The court employed a three-
factor test to determine whether the statement implied an assertion
of fact. 64 First, the court examined whether the use of "figurative
or hyperbolic language" negated the impression that the defendant
was serious. Second, the court examined the general tenor of the
context. Finally, the court examined the likelihood that the state-
ments would be proved true.65
Specifically, although some of the segment may have con-
tained hyperbole, the statement "it didn't work" could not per se be
construed as hyperbole.66 Secondly, although Rooney's segment
was generally humorous and satirical, the statement in question
was presented as fact.67 The overall tenor of the segment did not
override the specific statement to make the statement non-
actionable. Finally, the court believed Rooney's statement was ca-
pable of being construed as either true or false.6' Although the
statements might theoretically have been proved either true or
false, the plaintiff failed to show the statement implied a false as-
sertion of fact. When the plaintiff was unable to prove the state-
ment was false,- summary judgment was upheld for the defendant.
The Washington Court of Appeals employed a similar test, but
added a public policy consideration to its factors. The plaintiff in
61. 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990).
62. Id. at 1051. Rooney made the statement during a broadcast of 60 Minutes re-
garding junkmail Rooney had received. See id. The Plaintiff had sent Rooney a carton of
RAIN-X, which was supposed to keep rain off a car's windshield. See id.
63. See id. at 1053 (citing Milkovich).
64. See id. at 1053-54.
65. See id. at 1049, 1053-55.
66. See id. at 1054.
67. See id. Supporting this contention, the court cited the letters CBS received from
viewers, which indicated the viewers believed the statement "it didn't work" was fact.
See id.
68. See id. at 1054-55. "Although these are somewhat subjective determinations,
they are based on factual observations to a sufficient extent to imply an assertion of fact."
Id. at 1055.
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Haueter v. Cowles Publishing Co.6 9 sued the newspaper for pub-
lishing an article suggesting the plaintiff had retained up to eighty
percent of the proceeds of charity funds he had solicited." In
finding the statements not actionable, the court examined two gen-
eral questions as to rhetorical hyperbole. First, the broad question
is whether the statement is provably false. If the statement is not
provably false, as in the example of rhetorical hyperbole, then it is
per se non-actionable.7 On the other hand, if the statement is
provably false, the second question is whether the statement is
necessary to provoke public discussion. 2 In Haueter, as in Roo-
ney, the court ruled the plaintiff had not met his burden of proof as
to the statement's falsity.73
Other courts have relied more heavily on the context of the al-
legedly defamatory statements. As noted above, the contextual
factor was not specifically embraced by Milkovich, which focused
instead on verifiability. Preceding Milkovich, however, the con-
textual factor was very important in the Olman test. Notwith-
standing Milkovich, some courts appear reluctant to abandon the
contextual analysis.
Applying the contextual criterion in Florida Medical Center,
Inc. v. New York Post Co., 4 the court found that an article posi-
tioned above a business news story would likely be taken as fact.75
Following Milkovich, the primary test should have been whether an
assertion of fact was provably false. The Florida Medical' court,
however, placed more emphasis on context in determining whether
the plaintiff met the falsity burden. Specifically, the court exam-
ined context, language, content, and audience. 6 The court also fo-
69. 811 P.2d 231 (Wash. App. 1991).
70. See id. at 233-234.
71. See id. at 238.
72. See id. at 239. A statement necessary to public opinion is considered condition-
ally privileged. See id. The privilege is disallowed if the report is not fair and accurate.
See id. Furthermore, the plaintiff must prove the abuse of the privilege. See id.
73. See id. at 241.
74. 568 So.2d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
75. See id. at 459. The article insinuated a Florida hospital kept unclean facilities,
served unhealthy food, left patients in intensive care for excessive time periods to in-
crease bills, and often performed and billed for unnecessary tests and medication. See id.
at 459-60.
76. See id. at 459-60.
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cused on the status of a plaintiff as either a public or private figure
77in determining the level of fault required for recovery.
In determining whether a statement is verifiable, and thus ac-
tionable, courts following Milkovich also examine the context and
placement of the defamatory language. For example, in Moldea v.
New York Times Co.,7 the court found a statement that an allegedly
defamatory statement in a book review was "substantially true" as
a matter of law. The court reasoned that book reviews are an
"evaluation... of a type readers expect .... In addition, there
is a commonly held belief that the public will be able to distinguish
fact from opinion so long as the public knows the facts.
Not all state courts, however, have followed the Milkovich em-
phasis on verifiability. At least two states have found additional
speech protection in their respective state constitutions. These
states typically reject Milkovich and apply a broader definition of
opinion in order to promote free speech.
The first and most notable state jurisdiction to apply this rea-
soning was New York. In Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, ° a
scientific journal was found not liable for printing a letter to the
editor claiming that a company was using wild chimpanzees for
hepatitis research."' The Immuno case was being heard at the same
time that the Supreme Court considered Milkovich. Because the
court understood the impact Milkovich would have on Immuno, it
opted to stay its decision until the Supreme Court decided Milk-
ovich.82
Curiously, after having expressly awaited the Supreme Court
decision, the New York court rejected the Milkovich approach.
The court found Milkovich too technical. 3 More importantly, the
77. See id. at 458.
78. 22 F.3d 310 (D.D.C. 1994).
79. Id. at 315.
80. 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991).
81. See id. at 1272. The letter accused Immuno company of trying to avoid "inter-
national policies or legal restrictions on the importation of chimpanzees." Id. It also
suggested that the testing would spread hepatitis in the chimpanzee population. See id.
82. See id. at 1272.
83. See id. at 1273 (finding that the Milkovich decision focused too heavily on liter-
alism instead of considering the impression made by the words).
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court felt the Supreme Court had lost sight of the proper balance
between the protection of individual reputation and the promotion
of robust debate and free speech.
84
Requiring some justification for rejecting a United States Su-
preme Court decision on point, the court held that the New York
State Constitution is broader than the United States Constitution
and was therefore intended to provide greater protection for speech
and the press. 5 The court held that the United States Constitution
serves as only a minimum standard that can be supplemented by
the state constitution based on local needs and expectations."86
Rather than strictly adhering to the Milkovich approach, the Im-
muno court reverted to the fact/opinion distinction. To: determine
whether the chimpanzee statement was fact or opinion, the Olman
balancing test was utilized in its entirety. Thus, despite acknowl-
edging Milkovich, the New York Court of Appeals proceeded with
little regard for its holding.
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court circumvented Milk-
ovich, albeit not as plainly. In Cassidy v. Merin," the court did not
expressly reject Milkovich and replace it with the traditional test,
but rather the court applied a test altogether unrelated to Milk-
ovich.90 The New Jersey Supreme Court applied the fair comment
rule, under which the insurance commissioner's remarks regarding
ethics were pure opinion.9' Similar to the New York Supreme
84. See id. at 1275.
85. See id. at 1277-1278 (citation omitted). The court advanced the theory that state
courts have traditionally had the role of applying privileges. See id. at 1277.
86. See David, supra note 37, at 662 (interpreting Immuno as holding that the Su-
preme Court provides a floor of civil liberties below which the state cannot go, but the
state can provide additional protections for civil liberties based on state constitution).
87. See Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1275. The Immuno court did note that it was not
holding all letters to editor as absolutely immune by virtue of a wholesale opinion privi-
lege. See id.
88. See id. at 1281.
89. 582 A.2d 1039 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
90. See id. at 1048.
91. See id. at 1046. The New Jersey Insurance Commission complained to the Of-
fice of Attorney Ethics and the press about an attorney's letter writing campaign about
changes in the insurance code. See id. at 1041. The elements of the fair comment doc-
trine require 1) the statement be one of public concern; 2) the statement be based on true
or privileged facts; 3) the statement represent the actual opinion of the speaker; and 4) the
statement not be made with actual malice or the intent to cause harm. Several lower
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Court in Immuno, the New Jersey court found state law to be at
least as protective as federal law. 92 Furthermore, the court found
an absolute privilege for even opinion uttered with actual malice.
This appears to go even further than pre-Milkovich federal case
law.
The Supreme Court of Georgia and the federal district courts of
Georgia, on the other hand, have followed the Milkovich decision.
They first rejected a constitutional privilege for opinion, and then
applied a test faithful to the Milkovich decision.
In Eidson v. Barry,93 the Court of Appeals of Georgia rejected a
wholesale defamation exemption or privilege for opinion. Explic-
itly citing Milkovich, the Georgia court held that a statement is ac-
tionable if "reasonably interpreted as stating or implying defama-
tory facts about plaintiff and, if so, whether defamatory assertions
are capable of being proved false., 94 The court stated that "[a]ny
defamatory expression on matters of public concern that is prov-
able as false may carry liability under state defamation law."95
The Eidson decision involved defamation that allegedly oc-
curred in a letter to a newspaper editor. The printed letter claimed
that audiocassettes existed on which the local mayor and city
council members made racial slurs. 96 The letter further stated the
city attorney gave these tapes to the local newspaper in violation of
federal law. 97 The city attorney sued the newspaper that printed the
letter for libel.98
The lower court held the statements in the letter were opinion
and thus not actionable. 99 The Court of Appeals of Georgia re-
courts have applied the fair comment doctrine, which fell out of use when Gertz was de-
cided. See Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991).
92. See Cassidy, 582 A.2d at 1048.
93. 415 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
94. Id. at 17.
95. Id. (citing Milkovich).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. In Georgia, libel is defined as "a false and malicious defamation of an-
other, expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tending to injure the reputation of the
person and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." Id. (citing GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-5-1(a) (1982)).
99. See id. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant.
[Vol.9:45
CHALLENGING DEFAMATORY OPINIONS
versed, holding the accusation that the city attorney was guilty of a
crime was susceptible to being proved false and thus defamatory.'0°
With that decision, Georgia rejected the supposed Gertz constitu-
tional privilege for opinion and accepted the new standard of veri-
fiability.
In Brewer v. Purvis,'°' a federal district court offered its inter-
pretation of the two-prong Milkovich test to be applied in Georgia.
Again, the test hinged on verifiability; subjective, unverifiable
opinion about the plaintiff was not actionable under Georgia law.
02
While the court used the word "opinion," the verifiability test is
clearly present in the decision. The Brewer decision involved nu-
merous state and county agencies and officials involved in the in-
vestigation of a student's eligibility to play football. Ken Brewer,
a Clarke county football coach, was accused of asking teachers to
change a student's grades so the student could play football.0 3
Brewer brought a claim against Carol Purvis, the county school
superintendent, claiming Purvis defamed Brewer by recommend-
ing Brewer be terminated. °4 The federal court granted summary
judgment to the defendant. Brewer also sued the Georgia High
School Association ("GHSA") for intercommittee statements made
about Brewer.' 5 The federal court held the GHSA statements were
not libelous because they were never officially published. Georgia
law recognizes an exception to publication when communication is
intracorporate. 06
100. See id. at 17-18. The city attorney, however, conceded he was a public figure,
so the plaintiff had the added burden of proving the letter was written with actual malice.
See id. at 17 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). The judge
found the jury could have reasonably concluded the publishing newspaper acted with a
reckless disregard for the truth, constituting actual malice. See id. Essentially, the pub-
lisher assumed too much without checking any facts. See id. at 18.
101. 816 F.Supp. 1560 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
102. See id. at 1580.
103. See id. at 1564-65. The grades were changed only after the school determined
the student had a learning disability. See id. at 1565.
104. See id. at 1579.
105. See id. The GHSA is responsible for instructing local schools on eligibility of
its players. See id. at 1564.
106. See id. at 1579. An intracorporate communication is one "between members
of unincorporated groups.., and is heard by one who, because of his/her duty .... has
reason to receive the information .... I Id.
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Finally, Brewer sued William C. Fordham, an executive direc-
tor of GHSA who made public statements to a television reporter
about Brewer's alleged mistake of trying to change grades.' °7 In
this instance, the federal court held that Brewer might have been
libeled. First, the court rejected the opinion privilege. Specifi-
cally, it held the defendant was wrong to rely on S & W Seafoods,
Co. v. Jacor Broadcasting of Atlanta, °8 premised on the overly
broad dictum from Gertz, which had been subsequently clarified
by Milkovich.'0 9 The court continued to embrace Milkovich by
outlining and applying its two-prong test. The Brewer court stated
that under Milkovich, the first question is "whether a reasonable
fact finder could conclude that a statement implied a defamatory
assertion.""0 If the statement is plausibly defamatory, the second
question is whether the "defamatory assertion is factual enough to
be proved true or false."''. The court found Fordham's statements
about Brewer's conduct could be proved true or false, and thus, the
statements were not constitutionally protected."2 The defendant's
motion for summary judgment relating to providing allegedly de-
famatory statements to a television reporter was denied.
In cases of defamatory opinion disseminated over national ca-
ble television, for example, a public plaintiff seeking an appropri-
ate jurisdiction might take a closer look at Georgia precedent.
Ohio law seems similar. In Young v. Morning Journal,"3 the Ohio
Supreme Court held that a report of criminal contempt sufficiently
misidentified the contemnor that the inaccurate report could be
proven "false.""..4 By contrast, in the most recent New York deci-
sions, courts have continued to protect the press by emphasizing a
multi-factor test which immunizes opinion."'
107. See id. at 1568, 1580.
108. 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
109. See Brewer, 816 F. Supp. at 1580.
110. Id. (internal citation omitted).
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. 669 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 1996).
114. See id. at 1137-38.
115. See generally Millus v. Newsday, Inc., 675 N.E.2d 461 (N.Y. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 1313 (1997) (holding that in a newspaper editorial, a political candidate's
admission that "'he [did not] expect to win and [was] relieved by the prospect' was an
opinion); Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126 (N.Y. 1995) (immunizing an editorial
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CONCLUSION
The Milkovich decision may have introduced another era of
defamation to First Amendment law practice. For many years,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the Gertz dictum's constitu-
tional privilege for opinion were sacrosanct, as most courts ele-
vated the protection of press freedom to new heights. First
Amendment advocates had viewed the Gertz dictum as a necessary
component of the freedom, particularly in that it allowed trial
courts to dispose of defamation claims before they reached a jury.
With the 1990 Milkovich decision, however, many press advo-
cates became concerned that the "marketplace of ideas" might be
seriously curtailed. As illuminated by recent newsworthy events,
such fears have been unfounded until now. Today, media reck-
lessness is perceived to be at an all-time high. The Milkovich deci-
sion did not "chill" speech, after all.
Although the elimination of the so-called opinion privilege
means more defamation cases should go to the jury and fewer me-
dia defendants should receive summary judgment in most jurisdic-
tions, defendants are not without recourse. Now, defendants must
argue their allegedly defamatory speech was neither verifiably
false nor reckless.
Most state courts tend to follow Milkovich, which focuses on
verifiability, rather than a multi-factor-balancing test for opinion.
However, some jurisdictions, most notably New York and New
Jersey, continue to defer to the label of "opinion." These courts
adhere to the pre-Milkovich standard found in the Gertz dictum.
Regardless, both Milkovich and its progeny remain tools for curb-
ing more outrageous examples of media excess-as long as there
are plaintiffs angry enough to assume the risk and expense that a
defamation case entails.
column as opinion).
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